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SERGIO J. VISCOLI*

The Resource Conservation Group
Proposal to Lease Colorado River
Water
ABSTRACT
The Resource Conservation Group, Inc. seeks to lease Colorado River
water to San Diego. This offer follows in the wake of the Galloway
proposal which also sought to lease Colorado River water to San Diego.
However, the Galloway group could not get its proposal past the Upper
Colorado River Basin Commission. It remains to be seen whether the
Resource Conservation Group can get the Upper Basin commissioners to
see any worth in its new scheme which like its predecessor proposal is
likely to generate an unfavorable response. The Upper Basin commissioners are jealous guardians of the water originally apportioned to the
Upper Basin states under the Colorado River Compact of 1922' and are
not likely to approve the Resource Conservation Group's plans. This
paper explores the legal problems as well as the history behind the animositytowards this proposal.
BACKGROUND
California has an abundant supply of water but there is a shortage of
relatively inexpensive water because, as is so often the case, the regions
where population and irrigated agriculture are concentrated are also areas
where water is scarce.' Southern California provides a worthy illustration
of this ironical shortage. The Metropolitan Water District (MWD), founded
in 1928 for the purpose of transporting Colorado RiverWater to the South
Coast Basin, estimates that it needs more water to meet its future needs. 3
The MWD historically supplemented its member regions with Colorado
River water apportioned to but unused by Arizona.' The Central Arizona
*J.D., Member of the New Mexico Bar.

1. The Colorado River Compact of 1922, reprintedin Documents on the Use and Control of the
Waters of Interstate and International Streams (T. Witmer 2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Colorado
River Compact of 19221.
2. Vaux, Growth and Water in the South Coast Basin of California, in Water and Arid Lands of
the Western United States 233 (M. EI-Ashry & D. Gibbons, eds. 1988).
3. The MWD estimates a population increase from 12.3 million in 1980 to 16.5 million in 2000
as well as an increase in water demand from 3.06 maf in 1980 to 3.61 maf in 2000. Id. at 255
(citing Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, 1982 Population and Water Demand
Study Rep. 946. Los Angeles).
4. The Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California awarded Arizona 2.8 million acre feet
(maf) annually from the Colorado River and the rights to all water tributary to the Colorado. The
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Project (CAP) was designed to divert 1.2 million acre-feet (maf) yearly
to population centers in Phoenix and Tucson. With a fully operational
CAP, MWD will not longer enjoy this surplus water. Further, the quantification of Indian rights along the Colorado also threatens MWD's Colorado5 River supply. Hence, MWD will lose thousands of acre-feet every
year.
MWD has actively sought to augment its supply but has yet to secure
a reliable future supply. MWD has negotiated with the Imperial Irrigation
District to fund water conservation measures which would reduce irrigation use while increasing water available for municipal use. 6 An MWD
proposal to purchase Imperial Irrigation District water also failed." California voters failed to approve a proposal to construct a new canal, the
Peripheral Canal, to supply water from northern to southern California.'
It remains to be seen how MWD, in the face of consistent population
growth, will supply its users with affordable water.
One possible answer to southern California's water problem could come
from the Upper Colorado Basin.9 Unlike the Lower Basin which uses all
its share of available Colorado River water, the Upper Basin is not fully
using its share."° According to estimates, consumptive use for the year
2000 may vary between 4.2 maf and 5.8 maf." Steve Reynolds, the
Court also sustained federal claims for 5 Indian reservations along the lower Colorado. These claims
were left unquantified at the time. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565, 835 S. Ct. 1468, 1480
(1963). Arizona could not physically divert and transport this water to Phoenix and Tuscon where
the water was needed most. The unused portion that had aqueducts to transport the water to The
South Coast areas was used by California. Vaux, supra note 2, at 249-50.
5. A fully operational CAP and the further quantification of Indian water rights will reduce MWD's
supply from 1.212 maf to about 495,000 maf. Vaux, supra note 2, at 249-50.
6. Under the terms of this agreement, MWD would provide $10 million annually to the Imperial
Irrigation District to fund studies and projects that would result in conservation. Two years after the
agreement, MWD would receive 100,000 af annually in return. Id. at 274.
7. EI-Ashray and Gibbons, New Water Policies for the West, in Water and Arid Lands of the
Western United States, supra note 2, at 377, 378-79.
8. Regional self-preservation motivated the votes of many Northern Californians. However, a
general distaste for tax increases necessary to fund the canal soured most Californians' votes. See
id. at 380.
9. This area includes 102,000 square miles, located in southwestern Wyoming, western Colorado,
eastern Utah, northwest New Mexico, and northeastern Arizona. The major surface water supplies
are found in the Green, Upper Colorado mainstem, and the San Juan Howe & Ahrens. Water
Resources of the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin: Problems and Policy Alternatives, in Water and Arid
Lands of the Western United States, supra note 2, at 169, 171.
10. Weatherford & Jacoby, Impact of Energy Development on the Law of the ColoradoRiver, 15
Nat. Res. J. 171, 193 (1975) The average annual water availability to the Upper Basin varies from
5.25 maf to 5.8 maf even though 7.5 maf is annually allocated to the Upper Basin for beneficial
consumptive use under the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Howe & Ahrens, supra note 9, at
173.
11. A Deptartment of Interior estimate made in 1974 predicts consumptive use to be 6.0 maf.
See Weatherford & Jacoby, supra note 10, at 185-86 (citing U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Report on
Water for Energy in the Upper Colorado River Basin 40, Table 11 (1974)). More recent estimates
predict consumptive use to be 4.2 maf in the year 2000. See Howe & Ahrens, supra note 9, at 173.
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former New Mexico State Engineer, stated that all but 750,000 af of
water would be consumed annually by the year 2024. 2 If one calculates
the average net surface outflows, 3 the Upper Basin has 2,894,000 af of
excess water annually. 4 MWD could make use of this water without
constructing any more diversion works. The only safe assumption to draw
from these estimates is that while there is surplus water in the Upper
Basin, the amount of surplus will decrease over time. It should be noted
that the lack of reliable figures is an important factor which must be taken
into account before any changes to the current allocation scheme may be
made. MWD's projection of future water demand is, like any other prediction, subject to change. On the other hand, a host of variables prevent
precise projection of the Colorado River's future supply,"
Various compacts, federal laws, Supreme Court decisions, and an international treaty govern the Colorado River's development. Chief among
these legal institutions is the Colorado River Compact of 1922 ("the
Compact").' 6 The Compact apportions the waters of the Colorado between the Upper Basin states (Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, and
Utah) and the Lower Basin states (California, Arizona, and Nevada). The
dividing point between the two basins is at Lee Ferry in northern Arizona.
The Upper Basin states are entitled to beneficially consume 7.5 maf per
year and the Lower Basin states may beneficially consume 7.5 maf per
year.'" The Lower Basin states are also entitled to an additional 1 maf
per year under article 111(b).)' The Compact requires the release of at
least 75 maf every 10 years at Lee Ferry' and, most importantly, forbids
the Upper Basin from withholding any water that can not be reasonably
applied to domestic and agricultural use. Such water is to flow past Lee
Ferry for Lower Basin use."
THE GALLOWAY AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION GROUP
PROPOSALS

A private group has proposed two solutions to satisfy southern California's demand from the Upper Basin's supply. In 1984, the Galloway
Group, Ltd., a Colorado corporation, sold to the San Diego County Water
12. S. Reynolds, The Galloway Group Incident (Dec. 14,1984) (unpublished manuscript prepared

for the lecture presented before the Colorado River Water Users Ass'n.).
13. The average net surface outflows are calculated by subtracting the basin's consumptive use
from the amount of water originating in the basin.
14. The figure takes into account the dual obligation to Mexico and the Lower Basin. Howe &
Ahrens, supra note 9, at 182.
15. Weatherford & Jacoby, supra note 10, at 173.
16. Colorado River Compact of 1922, supra note I.
17. Id. at art. 111(a).
18. Id. at art. 111(b).
19. Id. at art. 111(c).

20. Id. at art. 111(e).
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Authority (SDCWA), itself an MWD member, a ten thousand dollar
option to lease Upper Colorado River water; namely 300,000-500,000 af
for 40 years. 2 Galloway claimed to have existing water rights to 1.3 maf
of Upper Basin water. The corporation intended to raise over $230,000,000
in private capital to construct dams and reservoirs for impoundment purposes. 22 Galloway planned to ship this water to San Diego via the river
and existing aquaducts. The proposal never got off the ground.
There are many reasons why the project failed. The prominent reason
cited for failure was the hostility of the six Upper Basin states. Member
states believed that Galloway's proposal would violate territorial use
limitations of the Compact. Steve Reynolds argued that the Compact gave
each basin an exclusive beneficial consumptive use to a specified amount
of water; therefore it would violate the Compact to sell Colorado River
water to California because California would then be buying more water
than it was apportioned.2' The Galloway group probably realized that it
was not economically feasible to fight such opposition in court. They
may have also realized that it would be a lot easier to market their plan
if they had the states as friends rather than as foes. Finally, their idea of
building more dams on the Colorado for storage, and alternatively for
hydroelectric power generation, was neither economically feasible nor
popular.'
The most recent proposal to lease water to southern California attempts
to correct Galloway's shortcomings. Resource Conservation Group, Inc.
(RCG) is a Colorado partnership composed of a corporation, Resource
Conservation Group, Inc., and various investors. The corporation is the
"operational managing partner" and is stuffed with prominent citizens
of several of the Compact states.2'
RCG has devised a "pooling concept" whereby RCG would utilize
existing water storage facilities to store water in excess of what would
be sold to Lower Basin consumers.27 Simply, RCG would commingle
what it maintains are three distinct types of Colorado River water. First
21. Gross, The Galloway Project and the Colorado River Compacts: Will the Compacts bar
Transbasin Diversions?, 25 Nat. Res. J.935, 936 (1985).
22. Id. at 936.
23. Telephone conversation with Dallen Jenson, attorney for Resource Conservation Group, Inc.
(Feb. 27,1980).
24. "Neither the Upper Division states nor their water right owners can by contract, control the
distribution of that water in the Lower Basin. If they tried to, it would be like offering to sell the
sleeves out of their vest." Statement of S.Reynolds, supra note 12, at 4.
25. Howe & Ahrens, supra note 9, at 216.
26. Former Governor Bruce Babbit is one such member. The investors include Doyle Berry, the
developer of the original Galloway proposal. Presentation by the Resource Conservation Group, Inc.
before the Upper Colorado River Commission (Nov. 16, 1989) (unpublished manuscript).
27. id. at 7.
28. Id.
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there is unallocated and under-developed free-flowing water currently
arriving at Lee Ferry and being used by the Lower Basin states. This is
the water described in art. 111(e) of the Compact. Second, there is water
allocated to the Upper Basin but not currently being used. This water
also flows past Lee Ferry. Third, there is consumptive use water. This is
water that is currently being used in the Upper Basin and never reaches
Lee Ferry. Commingling these three different types of water is economically necessary. RCG realizes that it must have more water than it offers
for sale because the Upper Basin states may make a call on their water.
By having more water than is necessary, RCG would be able to have a
supply available for its consumers and at the same time able to heed an
Upper Basin call. 2
RCG's proposal makes use of a second concept, a "privatization concept. "0 Basically, RCG contracts with the owner of a water right, paying
for the use but not taking his right. RCG takes the farmer or rancher's
right on a rotational basis; that is, for every year the water user does not
have water there are perhaps two years that the farmer does have water
for farming or ranching. RCG pays the farmer or rancher a "standby fee"
for the years the water is not utilized and a "take fee" for the years that
the water is utilized. The details of particular contracts would be subject
to negotiation. RCG then enters into leases with Lower Basin users,
collects the funds from the Lower Basin leases, keeping a certain percentage for itself, and returning the rest of the money to the state of origin
of the water. This money is placed in an escrow account and is earmarked
for future water development projects within the state."Ostensibly, this proposal has something in it for everyone. The water
right gives the farmer two sources of income. If farming or ranching falls
off there is always a quick dollar to be made leasing water to Lower
Basin users. RCG makes money as a middle man. The state does not
have to worry about permanent agricultural dryup because water is only
temporarily taken from the user. Further, the state is relieved of the
politically delicate decision to let farmers lease water. There is a guarantee, by virtue of the special escrow account, that state legislatures
cannot raid this money and use it for other purposes. It appears that RCG
has found an innovative way of helping the states meet the financial
shortfall created by the federal government's slow departure from its
reclamation philosophy.
The RCG proposal is different from the Galloway proposal because it
recognizes Upper Basin concerns and attempts to work these concerns
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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into its proposal. The fact that its operational group includes many prominent Upper Basin citizens further highlights RCG's realization that its
proposal will not fly unless the quarrelsome signatory states first mutually
agree to the proposal. The proposal is similar to the Galloway proposal
because it tests the limits of the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Because
the Compact provisions relevant to this proposal are clouded in ambiguities, it is impossible to say whether the RCG proposal violates the
express terms of the Compact. Nevertheless, it is possible to highlight
the significant issues and provide tentative answers.
THE LAW OF THE RIVER
RCG's basic proposal transfers water from the Upper Basin to the
Lower Basin. Before analyzing specific legal problems arising from RCG's
pooling concept, it is necessary to determine whether RCG's contemplated
transfer violates the Compact.32 The Compact neither expressly prohibits
nor expressly allows the sale or lease of water from the Upper Basin to
the Lower Basin. Thus, it is necessary to ask whether any Compact
provisions suggest that such a transfer is prohibited. It has been argued
that the Compact requires each Basin to use its apportionment within that
Basin's own territory." A finding that each Basin can only use its apportioned water within its Basin would preclude RCG from selling Upper
Basin water to Lower Basin users.
It is impossible to interpret the Compact without reviewing its historical
context. The Lower Basin states realized and Upper Basin states feared
the doctrine of prior appropriation given Supreme Court approval in the
context of interstate apportionment in Wyoming v. Colorado.3' The Supreme Court held that prior appropriators possess a better right to the
continuous use of water than do subsequent users. Lower Basin states,
especially California, had plans to immediately put the Colorado's water
to use. Imperial Valley irrigators in southern California sought storage
on the river to provide a stable supply." The Upper Basin states were
afraid that California would get legally enforceable rights to such water
at the expense of their slow but inevitable development.' The Upper
Basin wanted to reserve some water before California grabbed it all.
California wanted a compact so it could get federal assistance for reclamation plans.37
32. The Compact applies to the RCG proposal because individual holders of water rights are
bound by state law which is in turn bound by compacts to which states ae signatory. See Hinderlider
v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1937).
33. See Gross, supra note 21, at 940.
34. 259 U.S. 419 (1921).
35. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1966).
36. Id.
37. id.
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There were other concerns as well. The states, especially California
and Colorado, wished to guarantee the right to transport water outside
the drainage area of the Colorado River to growing metropolitan areas,
such as Los Angeles and Denver.3" The state-appointed commissioners
knew that Congress had to approve the Compact and wished to divide
the water without getting into an imbroglio with Congress over whether
the federal government or the states owned the water. The Compact was
carefully phrased to address these concerns. The Compact did not specifically address the sale of water between basins. Nevertheless, the concern that the Lower Basin would develop legally enforceable rights before
the Upper Basin could fully utilize its share was a concern that motivated
the particular phrasing of several of the Compact's provisions. These
provisions, or territorial use limitations, arguably forbid leases or sales
of water between basins.
The Compact's Territorial Use Provisions
The first territorial use limitation is found within Article I, the definitions section of the Compact. The Compact divides the river into two
basins. The Upper and Lower Basins consist of:
those parts of [either the states of the Upper or Lower Basin] within
and from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River System
above Lee Ferry, and also all parts of said States located without the
drainage area of the Colorado River System which are now or shall
hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the system
below Lee Ferry.39
The Compact defines the basins in such a way that states within a basin
may transport apportioned water outside of the actual drainage basin of

the river.' Hence water may be transferred to thirsty Denver and Los
Angeles, cities outside of the drainage area of the river but within states
where the river drains. The fact that transbasin diversions were defined
only in terms of respective basins would not pose an interpretive problem
were it not for article 11 (b) which curiously states that:
[t]he term "Colorado River Basin" means all of the drainage areas
of the Colorado River System and allother territorywithin the United
States of America to which the waters of the ColoradoRiver System
could be beneficially applied."'

Read in conjunction with article 1I(f) and (g) which state that water
may be transported anywhere outside of the drainage area of the river
38.
39.
40.
41.

R. Olson, The Colorado River Compact 186 (1926).
Colorado River Compact of 1922, supra note I at art. 11(f) and (g).
Id.
Id. at art. 11(b) (emphasis added).
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but within that state, one is left with the uneasy conclusion that intrabasin
transfers are permitted, inter basin transfers are not permitted, but one
state may divert water to a state not signatory to the Compact. Nevertheless, history suggests the better conclusion that article 11(b) was intended to allay Colorado's and California's concerns that they would not
be able to supply water to Denver and Los Angeles. 42 The fact that the
United States is mentioned could reflect an awareness that the Compact
was not infringing on the federal government's rights to enter into a treaty
with Mexico. Further, the definition of Upper and Lower Basin is more
specific than the definition of the whole Basin.
These definitions reflect an understanding that a user did not have a
better right to water solely because he was within the watershed. 43 This
definition defines riparians in terms of two basins while recognizing that
the creation of a riparian system via a compact does not preclude the
recognition of a right in one who is able to transfer water outside of the
watershed.' Any interpretation of these sections must understand the
concerns behind the wording: that each basin be protected from the development of the other basin; and that states within a basin be allowed
to transfer the river's waters to areas outside of the watershed.
Article III apportions the water. While the phrasing of this section
contemplates territorial use restrictions, its wording also reflects a desire
to avoid taking a stand on the thorny question of whether the states or
the federal government owned the water.
Article 111(a) apportions for "exclusive beneficial consumptive use,"
7.5 maf per year to both the upper and Lower Basins. Article III(b)
then allows the Lower Basin an additional I maf per year.' Any water
above these amounts is considered "surplus" under the Compact. Surplus
is to be used to supply Mexico's share. 7
The apportionment scheme makes sense if the reasons behind the apportionment are kept in mind. The commissioners recognized the importance of protecting the future right to use water from the prior
appropriation doctrine. The apportionment was worked out to protect a
42.
43.
44.
45.

See R. Olson, supra note 38, at 185.
See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882).
Id.
Colorado River Compact of 1922, supra note I at art. 111(a).

46. Id. at art. 111(b).

47. Under a treaty with Mexico made in 1944, Mexico was guaranteed 1.5 maf per year from
the Colorado River. The Rio Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana Treaty, Feb. 3, 1944, United StatesMexico, art.X(a), 59 Star. 1219, T.S. No. 994. Reprinted in Documents on the Use and Control of
the Waters of Interstate and International Streams (T. Witmer 2d ed. 1968). Should there not be any
surplus, then article 111(c) mandates that each basin must share in the deficiency by subtracting
Mexico's share from their respective shares. Article 111(f) then states that any existing water not
already apportioned in articles InI (a)-(c) and not beneficially used shall become available for further
apportionment. Colorado River Compact of 1922, supra note I at art. 11(f).
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slowly developing basin from the expansion of a rapidly developing basin.
The word "exclusive" suggests such a territorial limitation. While the
term "beneficial consumptive use" was left undefined, there is no evidence that these three words suggest any territorial use limitations. Rather,
the word "exclusive" was meant to keep separate each basin's 7.5 maf
apportionment while beneficial consumptive use was to be interpreted
according to the manner in which this common water law phrase is usually
interpreted."

While not a territorial use provision, article 111(e) serves to guarantee
each basin its share of water by ensuring a flow between the two basins.
In the absence of an apportionment of unused waters, the Upper Basin
cannot withhold any water which cannot be beneficially applied to use. '9
Article 111(e) permits one state to use water which another state cannot
presently use, provided that the latter state may, "make a call on such
water when it is ready to use it.""' Hence article 111(e) protects the Upper
Basin from rights which the Lower Basin may seek to assert on the
grounds that it was able to use this water before the Upper Basin. Article
111(e) also ensures that water will flow to the Lower Basin.
Another territorial use limitation is found in article VIII. This article
contemplates the construction of storage facilities. Once such storage
facilities are built, present and perfected Lower Basin rights will be
satisfied from these facilities rather than from the river itself." The article
then goes on to state: "[a]ll other rights [rights other than those perfected
at the time the Compact was ratified] shall be satisfied solely from the
water apportioned to that basin in which they are situated."52 Again, the
Compact's language affirms that the division of waters is meant to protect
each basin's share from the other basin.
The provisions do not reflect the commissioners' chief aim to create a
48. Gross, supra note 21, at 945. There is evidence in the records of the 1922 Colorado River
Commission proceedings that the term "beneficial consumptive use" was used because it avoided
the issue of whether the United States or the states had ownership rights in the water. A statement
included in the official records of the proceedings stated that:
the States of the Upper Division ... wish to state affirmatively .. .that it is the
understanding that the use of the language in article III constitutes no waiver on their
part or on the part of any one of them to any claim of ownership which they may
have to the corpus of the waters or any recognition of.any right or claim on the part
of the United States to the corpus of any of the unappropriated waters of the stream,
it being the understanding of those states that the language used is a middle ground
which in no way raises or affects the title of ownership.
Colorado River Commission, Minutes of the Second Part, Meeting of Nov. 24, 1922, Bishop's
Lodge, Santa Fe, p. 12, Friday, 10:00 a.m. (quoted in R. Olson, supra note 38, at 36.
For this reason the term "apportionment" was also favored over the term "appropriation").
49. Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. InI(e) supra note I, at art. III
(e).
50. Meyers, supra note 35, at 17.
51. Colorado River Compact of 1922, supra note 1, at art. VIII. See, Meyers, supra note 35, at
13.
52. Meyers, supra note 35, at 13.
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riparian system between the two basins. They sought to protect each
basin's use of water by separating the two basins. However, the commissioners were not dictating how the water in each basin was to be used.
Hence, one searches the Compact's provisions in vain for specific provisions forbidding RCG's leasing scheme. New Mexico State Engineer
Steve Reynolds contends that "exclusive" as used in article 111(a) means
that the water has to be used in the basin for which the water is apportioned. 3 However, the word "exclusive" may mean that the Upper Basin's right to 7.5 maf is a right which it does not have to share with others.
It may be that the word "exclusive," as well as the other territorial use
provisions, were only meant to create a riparian system that protects each
Basin from the other.
Nevertheless, RCG's proposal to lease Upper Basin water to the Lower
Basin violates the spirit of the Compact. Perhaps the reason the Compact
does not expressly address the lease of water is because the Compact
itself was meant to obviate the need for such transfers; by allocating each
Basin a specific share of water there was no need for the Upper Basin to
sell or lease water to the Lower Basin. Article 111(e) was meant to cover
situations where the Upper Basin was not using its full share. Each basin
was to get a specific share and each state within each basin was allowed
to transfer water to areas where it was needed most.
A leasing arrangement would not violate the terms of the Compact
because ownership would not pass from the Upper Basin to the Lower
Basin. Nevertheless, such a leasing arrangement could intensify the fear
that motivated the division of the river into two basins. By forfeiting the
right to use the water for a period of years, the Lower Basin could develop
rights to the water which the Upper Basin may ultimately find difficult
to disturb.' It is possible that the aquisition of such rights could give the
Lower Basin more water than it was apportioned.
RCG's Pooling Concept
Even if this proposal does not violate the Compact's general purpose,
RCG's pooling concept arguably violates specific Compact provisions.
RCG states that there are three types of water in the Colorado. The first
type of water is water which RCG states is article Ill(e) water. RCG
defines this water as unallocated, undeveloped water. It appears that RCG
means that this water is "surplus" water as surplus water is defined in
the Compact. Because RCG defines type two water as water that is
allocated to Upper Basin use,55 and because they say that article Ill(e)
53. S. Reynolds, supra note 12, at 2.
54. The same fear is prevalent in the proposed transferof Indian rights toAnglo users. Weatherford
& Jacoby, supra note 10, at 201.
55. Presentation by the Resource Conservation Group, supra note 26, at 6.
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water is "surplus" water, RCG maintains that this water is different from
type two and type three water.56 RCG defines "surplus" water as article
IIl(e) water while the Compact defines "surplus" water without reference
to article 111(e). Under the Compact, surplus water is the excess of the
Upper and Lower Basins' respective shares of 7.5 maf per year.5" Because
the annual virgin flow averages less than 16 maf,5 s there is no surplus
water barring years of unusual flow. Because the Upper Basin does not
use all of its annual apportionment, a lot of water has been stored creating
excess water. For example, the total amount in Upper Basin storage in
1981 was roughly 25,538,000 af (total storage capacity is about 33 maf).
Hence in 1981 there was an excess of eight maf.59 It is clear, however,
that had the Upper Basin used its 7.5 maf each year, there would be no
surplus water because annual virgin flow is usually less than 16 maf.
Hence the eight maf surplus in 1981 is not surplus water from the virgin
flow of the river for that year (when the virgin flow was less than 16
maf) but is an accumulation of water that the Upper Basin did not use.
RCG contends that such unused water cannot be withheld by the Upper
Basin," because article Ill(e) mandates that water which is not beneficially
used cannot be withheld from the Lower Basin. Such water flows to Lee
Ferry and the Lower Basin can use it free of charge. However, simply
because water is article lll(e) water does not mean that it is surplus water.6 '
Type two water is water that is allocated to the Upper Basin as part
of its 7.5 maf apportionment, but is not being used although it is perhaps
earmarked for use. 62 If the Upper Basin does not use this water, then it
too flows past Lee Ferry. Should the Upper Basin have met its delivery
obligation to the Lower Basin and also have met its share of its obligation
to Mexico under article 111(c) and still have water left over after its
consumptive uses have been satisfied, there is the question of whether
such water may be withheld by the Upper Basin. RCG admits that its
proposal would never get off the ground if it depended only on type two
water because the Lower Basin would not pay for water already flowing
past Lee Ferry." Steve Reynolds, the former New Mexico State Engineer,
56. Id. at 19.
57. Colorado River Compact of 1922, supra note 1, at art. 111(e).
58. The virgin flow for 1981 was just over eight maf. Upper Colorado River Commission, 1981
Ann. Rep. 24 (1982).
59. Id. at Table 2.
60. Presentation by Resource Conservation Group, supra note 26, at 6.
61. Because both surplus and article 111(e) water are to flow to the Lower Basin free of charge,
there really is no difference between the two. Why then does RCG create two separate types of
water? RCG probably creates these two separate types of water in order to give life to their type
two water which they would like to pool and lease to the Lower Basin.
62. Presentation by Resource Conservation Group, supra note 26, at 6.
63. This question also applies to RCG's type one water.
64. Presentation by Resource Conservation Group, supra note 26, at 19.
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agreed. He maintained that under article I(e) such water becomes apportioned to the Lower Basin and available for use free of charge. 5
Arguably, the Upper Basin can withhold unused water from the Lower

Basin whenever there is less than 7.5 maf in a year because the Upper
Basin has an absolute right to 7.5 maf per year and can store the excess
water which it does not use.' Article Il(e), however, mandates that any
water that cannot be beneficially used must flow to the Lower Basin.6
Ironically, RCG resolves this conflict in its favor by supporting the Upper
Basin argument that the Upper Basin may reserve water that it has been
apportioned but is not using. RCG creates type one water to give meaning
to its type two water. If one contends that there is hardly ever surplus
water, and that under article III(e) water not used even if part of the
Upper Basin's 7.5 annual maf apportionment must flow to the Lower
Basin, then article III(e) water exists in the type two water. However, if
one maintains that unused apportioned water may stay in the Upper Basin,
then there would never be any article III(e) water except, of course, in
years of unusual flow. At the very minimum, this pooling concept reopens
old questions that were never conclusively resolved.
RCG maintains that this water is different from "surplus" water because
even though it spills out of dams unused, it is earmarked- for existing
projects. Unlike surplus water, where there are no existing users or even
anticipated uses, this water could always be used. However, in the absence
of actual use, it is hard to see how this water is different from water
flowing past Lee Ferry. Although there may be contracts for its use, it
is not being consumptively used.
However, both these types of water are different from RCG's third
type of water, consumptive use water. This is water that is currently being
used in the Upper Basin. This water, like type two water, is water that
RCG would like to lease. RCG maintains that type two and type three
water are similar because both types of water are allocated for use and
the Upper Basin is more likely to be interested in leasing allocated water
because the Lower Basin does not have a legal right to the free use of
such water."
By pooling this water, RCG would assemble a larger amount of water
65. S. Reynolds, supra note 12, at 4.
66. Meyers, supra note 35, at 21.
67. Id. at 25. Under article I(a) and (b) the supply comes first from surplus. If there's a deficiency,
then the literal reading of article 1ll(e) mandates that the deficiency is shared equally. If the supply
is 15 maf and the Upper Basin is using 3 maf but the Lower Basin is using its full 7.5 maf, the
Lower Basin would have to cut back on its use in order to supply Mexico. Suppose there is enough
for 8.5 maf for the Lower Basin and existing 3 maf worth of uses in the Upper Basin. There is a
total of 11.5 plus 3.5 in an Upper Basin dam or 15 maf. Article 111(c) says that each side shares
equally. But article II(e) says that the Upper Basin may not be able to withold all but 750,000 af
of this 3.5 maf. Hence there is an internal conflict within the Compact. id.
68. Presentation by Resource Conservation Group, supra note 26, at 7.
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than would actually be committed to the Lower Basin. However, there
may be no pool if type one water does not really exist on a predictable
basis and if type two water is perceived as water which the Lower Basin
gets free of charge even though there is a paper contract or plan for its
use. RCG's type three water would be the only type of water. In other
words there could be two types of water, type two and type three water,
but type two water might not be included if article 111(e) covers this water
as well. Of course the lack of an ability to pool water would be a serious
impediment to RCG's plans because Lower Basin users would not be
able to rely on an adequate supply. With the pooling concept, an Upper
Basin state could make a call on water that was previously earmarked
for an existing use and RCG would still have enough rights assembled
to meet Lower Basin demands by leasing type three water. Without the
pooling concept, RCG would only be able to assemble rights to consumptive use water.'
THE UPPER BASIN COMPACT APPLIED TO RCG'S PROPOSAL
Aside from legal problems arising from the Compact, this proposal
also faces problems under the Upper Basin Compact. As has been seen,
the negotiators of the Compact of 1922 overestimated the annual virgin
flow of the Colorado River. Because Lower Basin uses had increased
while Upper Basin uses remained unchanged,7" it became apparent that
only storage would enable the Upper Basin to both expand and meet its
delivery obligation to the Lower Basin. 7 But the Bureau of Reclamation
refused to authorize any programs until the Upper Basin divided amongst
its member states its share of water.' Hence the Upper Basin states
negotiated a new compact.7 3 The negotiators set out to divide the water
by apportioning fixed percentages based upon the 7.5 maf annually apportioned to the Upper Basin by the original Compact.'
The commissioners also had to determine how much water there was
for each state to use and how much water each state was using. The
69. Even with the pooling concept RCG would have to make clear exactly what type of water it
was leasing to a Lower Basin user because water rights are inherently individual in nature. The
Upper Basin would never allow RCG to adopt a scheme whereby the characteristics of rights became
undistinguishable from other rights because the individual flavor of such rights might be lost.
70. Upper Colorado River Commission, 1954 Ann. Rep. 23 (1955) (cited in Meyers, supra note
35, at 27).
71. Meyers, supra note 35, at 27.
72. Id.
73. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948, reprinted in Documents on the Use and
Control of the Waters of Interstate and International Streams (T. Witmer 2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as Upper Basin Compact of 19481.
74. Id. at art. 111(f). Article 111(f) declares that the percentage allocation applies only to the 7.5
maf apportioned by article 111(a) of the Compact of 1922.
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commissioners adopted the inflow definition of water use.75 This definition
took into account the fact that the Colorado loses water as it nears its
mouth. The inflow was calculated by using historic virgin flow data at
state lines. 76 Outflow was measured at gauging stations at the state line."
A credit was given for salvaged channel losses.7" The difference between
the inflow and the outflow equaled the state's beneficial consumptive
use.79 This definition was useful to the Upper Basin whose many small
diversions made it impossible to measure each consumptive use.' Furthermore, "this formula does not charge users for water they apply to
beneficial use if the water would have been lost anyway in a state of
nature."'" Hence the Upper Basin could consume more than 7.5 maf
because much water returns to nature.82
It is hard to fit RCG's proposed leasing scheme into the Upper Basin's
use calculations. First, any diversion would have to be charged to the
Upper Basin, otherwise the Lower Basin would be receiving more water
at Lee Ferry than it is entitled to receive. Each diversion would also have
to be measured at the site of diversion which is contrary to the Upper
Basin method of measuring outflows at state lines. Because RCG plans
on using the river to transport water to the Lower Basin, the amount of
water leased to the Lower Basin would reach the state line and be measured as part of the outflow, that is, as part of the water to be used to
satisfy that state's contribution towards the Lower Basin's share at Lee
Ferry. However, this would not be equitable because the amount diverted
has to be charged to the Upper Basin. It would not be possible to subtract
the amount leased to the Lower Basin from the state's inflow because
this figure is based upon historical data. Therefore, the amount leased to
the Lower Basin would have to be measured at the site of diversion. Such
measurement would either have to consider the amount leased a complete
diversion or a complete return flow. Such individual measurements could
lead to regulation of individual users who may not necessarily desire such
quantification.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE APPLIED TO THE RCG PROPOSAL
Of course RCG's consumptive use water may not be freely available
for sale to Lower Basin interests. If the Compact's territorial use limi75. Meyers, supra note 35, at 29.
76. Id. at 30.
77. Id. at 29.

78. Id. The formula is expressed as: "'depletion at state line - virgin flow - man-made depletions
+ salvage." Id.
79. Id. at 30.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 19.
82. Gross, supra note 21, at 941,
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tations forbid the sale and transfer of Upper Basin water to the Lower
Basin, the question remains whether it would be a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause for the Compact to forbid individual Upper Basin users
from entering into leasing arrangements with the Lower Basin via RCG's
intermediary role.
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution states that, "Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce ...among the several
states .. "83 The Commerce Clause has been interpreted to mean that
when Congress has the power to regulate commerce among states but
has not acted, the states may not regulate in such a way that unduly
burdens commerce. A state may not enact a statute which unnecessarily
burdens the exportation of its resources. Such statutes are considered
embargoes." The Supreme Court has stated that water is an article of
commerce. A state may conserve water, but it must do so in a nondiscriminatory manner."
At the same time, however, the Constitution gives the states the power,
with the consent of Congress, to enter into compacts with other states."
Water compacts typically govern the use of named waters among the
signatory states. Such compacts often have territorial use restrictions and
their effect is to give the signatory states and their citizens preferred rights
over the use of such waters.8 The Commerce Clause seeks to avoid the
economic Balkanization that results from one state hoarding its resources.
However, compacts allow groups of states to divide resources amongst
themselves thus magnifying the effects of economic Balkanization."8
Compacts, as exercises of state sovereignty, are subject to Commerce
Clause analysis.8 If, however, compacts are considered federal law, they
are immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny, because, "[only state regulation which Congress has not expressly authorized is vulnerable to
commerce clause attack."'
83. U.S. Const. art. 1,sec. 8., cl.3.
84. J.Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J.Young, Constitutional Law section 8.9 (3rd ed. 1986).
85. Sportase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 3459 (1982).
86. U.S. Const. art. I sec. 10, cl. 3). See Gross, supra note 21, at 938. Gross stated, "The
Compact Clause of the Constitution required federal consent, so that Congress would determine
whether the arrangement truly was a compact and Congress could exercise 'national supervision'
and 'protect national interests' from undue erosion of national sovereignty." Id. at 938 (quoting Petty
v. Tennessee-Missouri Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 282 n.7, 288).
87. Simms & Davis, Water Transfers across State Systems, Min. L. Inst. 22-1 sec. 27.05 (1986).
88. Practically speaking, this fear is unfounded. The Colorado River Compact was designed to
settle possible disagreements over the use and apportionment of water by states that could make use
of the water at the time when the Compact was formed. R. Olson, supra note 38, at 186. The
Compact included as signatory states all who could possibly make use of the water. Hence Ohio
could not claim that the Colorado River Compact enables its signatory states to hoard water because
Ohio could never afford to transport the River's water. While states situated in close proximity to
the Colorado River Basin states might be able to afford to transport Colorado river water, it was not
economically feasible to do so at the time the Compact was written. Id.
89. See generally, Simms & Davis, supra note 87.
90. Gross, supra note 21, at 954.
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Despite the fact that the framers of the Compact did not intend to hoard
water per se, an impermissable purpose could be inferred from a discriminatory effect. Therefore it is necessary to analyze whether the Commerce Clause prohibits the application of territorial use limitations when
they operate in a manner that disallows the lease of Upper Basin water
to Lower Basin interests.

"[O]nce given, 'congressional consent transforms an interstate compact

... into a law of the United States."' 9 ' In Texas v. New Mexico, the
Court was concerned with whether it could rewrite the Pecos River Compact to avoid a deadlock created in the Compact which threatened to
make it unworkable. New Mexico and Texas each had one vote on actions
arising under the Compact, while the United States representative, the
third commissioner, had no vote. The Supreme Court stated that because
a compact is federal law it was powerless to rewrite it absent any constitutional problems.9'
Following this decision, the Ninth Circuit heard a case involving a
proposed sale of water regulated by the Yellowstone River Compact.93
This case followed in the wake of a water company's attempt to divert
30,000 af of Yellowstone River water for municipal and industrial use
outside of the river's basin. Intake Water Company argued that the Compact was subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny because Congress had not
expressly stated that the compact was immune from such scrutiny. The
Ninth Circuit held that when Congress approved a compact, it was acting
within its authority to immunize state law from constitutional objections
by transforming the law into a federal statute." The Ninth Circuit placed
heavy reliance on NortheastBancorp Inc. v. Board of Governors of the
FederalReserve System," in which the Supreme Court held that an interstate banking agreement between Massachusetts and Connecticut did
not burden interstate commerce. In a generous holding the Supreme Court
stated that, "[wihen Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly
authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce
Clause."' The Ninth Circuit refused to go further and analyze whether
Congress intended to allow the Compact to burden commerce by precluding sales of water.
Were it not for the Supreme Court's holding in Sporhase v. Nebraska
that water is an article of commerce, there would be no argument that
91. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983) (quoting Cuyler v. Adams. 449 U.S. 433,
438 (1981) and citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 566 (1852)).
92. d. at 564-66.
93. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 769 F2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985),
aff'g 590 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mont. 1983).
94. Id. at 570 (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
95. 472 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 2545 (1985).
96. Id. at 175, 105 S.Ct. at 2554.
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compacts were not immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny.' There is
the chance, however, that the Supreme Court may one day resolve the
issue. Faced with the argument that because Congress did not expressly
exempt the Compact from Commerce Clause scrutiny, the Supreme Court
may decide that Congress did not intend to let the states burden commerce." On the other hand, the Court may respond that an interstate
compact is the same as any other agreement given congressional approval." It is therefore necessary to consider whether the Colorado River
Compact of 1922 is federal law and then decide whether it is immune
from Commerce Clause scrutiny.
Congress has not expressly stated that this Compact is immune from
Commerce Clause scrutiny. However, there can be little doubt that the
Compact is federal law. When the Compact was written, states realized
that they could not tame the river without federal money. The Bureau of
Reclamation's philosophy of developing the arid West saw its greatest
triumph in the taming of this river. If Congress did not expressly legislate
a division of the Colorado it was because a compact provided the best
way to further the development of the West. A compact was well suited
to the purpose of ensuring that the young agricultural and power interests
could grow in a climate free from quarrelsome and selfish state interests.
The supervisory role of the federal government has played such a major
role in the development of the Colorado that it would be hard to say that
the Compact was only an exercise of state sovereignty. For example, in
the Colorado River Basin Act of 1968, itself a child of the 1922 Compact,
Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to "adopt 'criteria for
the coordinated long-range operation' of the federal reservoirs in the
Colorado River System.""°° Even before this Act, the Secretary of the
Interior was in charge of operating the dams,' and his decisions in his
capacity as door keeper often threatened state sovereignty. In 1964, when
97. 458 U.S. at 954, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982). in Sporhse, the Court recognized in dicta that
the compacts provide an example of constitutionally permissible restrictions on the use of water. Id.
at 956.
98. In cases where a state is allegedly burdening interstate commerce, the Supreme Court will
apply strict scrutiny to analyze whether there is a burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Hughes
v. Oklahoma 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
99. Various arguments have been raised as to how the Supreme Court should resolve this conflict
in the event that the issue does present itself before the High Court. Some have proposed that surface
water should be considered an article of commerce in order to further the policy of transferring water
to areas where it is needed most. See generally Simms & Davis, supra note 87. Others have proposed
that equitable apportionment should govern both surface water and groundwater. See Utton, In
Search of An Integrating Principle For Interstate Water Law: Regulation versus the Market Place,
25 Nat. Res. J. 985 (1985). The Colorado Compact is more than congressional approval of state
sovereignty, it is federal law.
100. Colorado River Basin Act of 1968, 43 U.S.C. § 1501, 1552 (1988) (quoted in Weatherford
& Jacoby, supra note 10, at 178.
101. Meyers, supra note 35, at 22.
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Secretary Udall opened the gates at Glenn Canyon Dam to provide water
for power production at Hoover Dam, he reduced the water level at Lake
Powell, thus reducing Upper Basin power generation and revenues which
were used to pay for Upper Basin Irrigation projects. "0To say that the
Compact of 1922 is only an expression of state sovereignty is to effectively
ignore the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Colorado River Basin Act
of 1968, and the Upper Colorado River Compact, all the progeny of the
Compact of 1922. The Supreme Court did not forget history
0 3 when it
stated that the Compact of 1922 addressed national concerns.
Whether this Compact is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny
depends on how closely one analyzes the terms of and history behind the
Compact. The Supreme Court could hold that an interstate compact is
just like any other agreement and that it is immune from Commerce
Clause scrutiny. On the other hand, the Court could decide to take a
closer look and answer the question of whether Congress intended to
preclude market transfers when it approved the Compact.
While Congress did not expressly state that the Compact was immune
from Commerce Clause scrutiny, it ratified a Compact that addressed
Commerce Clause issues existing at the time. The Compact's provisions
make it clear that the Commissioners were cognizant of the federal government's possible rights in the river's waters. The Comissioners took
the view that the Colorado was not a navigable stream.'" In Gibbons v.
Ogden, ' the Supreme Court stated that the Commerce Clause empowers
Congress to regulate transportation of persons and property by land and
by water. But because Congress had contemplated the construction of the
Boulder Canyon Dam, it was generally agreed that Congress did not
intend to exercise its Commerce Clause power over navigable streams. "°
Consequently, article IV of the Compact states that since the Colorado
has ceased to be navigable, the use of its waters for navigational purposes
would be subservient to all other possible uses. 0 7 The Compact then
states that, "[ijf the Congress shall not consent to this paragraph, the
other provisions of this compact shall nevertheless remain binding.""
Furthermore, the Compact reserves the federal government's right to
allocate a portion of the river's water to Mexico."° Finally, the Com102. Id. at 22.
103. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 554 (1963).
104. R. Olson, supra note 38, at 101. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). In this
precursor to the Court's decision in 1963, the Court held that Congress exercised its Commerce
Clause power over the Colorado as a navigable stream by constructing a dam.
105. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. 185 (1824) cited in R. Olson, supra note 38, at 101.
106. R. Olson, supra note 38, at 110.
107. Colorado River Compact of 1922, supra note 1. at art. IV.
108. Id. at art. IV(a).
109. Id. at art. 111(c).
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missioners took great pains to select the words "apportionment" and
"beneficial consumptive use" so as not to take a stand on whether the
federal government or the states had ownership rights in the water.' 0 The
commissioners were aware of the tension existing between the respective

spheres of federal and state authority and did not wish to create an
unconstitutional document. Had groundwater been declared an article of
commerce and had it been known that groundwater and surface water are
hydrologically connected then the wording of the Compact might have
been different. It could be argued that RCG is not violating the Compact
provisions that were given congressional approval. Thus, it could be
argued that Congress did not consent to a Compact that prohibited the
lease of water from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin.
This argument is a long shot which is -likely to miss its target entirely.
There is no single compact provision that could be declared unconstitutional without invalidating the entire Compact. The territorial use limitations are so woven into the fabric of the Compact that it is hard to
pinpoint their existence. The Supreme Court is not likely to apply strict
scrutiny to invalidate two or three or four clauses of a compact which
set into motion a whole host of federal laws, Supreme Court decisions,
state laws, and an international treaty."' At the expense of what may be
an implied violation of the Commerce Clause it would be even more
unwise to tamper with a document on which has been placed so much
reliance.
If the Compact's territorial use limitations preclude the Upper Basin
farmer from contracting with Lower Basin users there is no violation of
the Commerce Clause. Further, an individual citizen of an Upper Basin
state is bound by the terms of the Compact. In Hinderliderv. La Plata
River andCherry Creek Ditch Co., "2 the Supreme Court held that whether
an apportionment is made by compact or by judicial decree, "the apportionment is binding upon the citizens of each state and all water
110. R. Olson, supra note 38, at 319, Chairman Hoover, commissioner for the United States
stated:

I am sitting hem between two fires; one that this compact doesn't properly protect
the unappropriated waters in the sense of the federal government's rights to them,
the other the extreme state right that would contend that the corpus of the water
title rests in the state ...I have thought we could avoid the whole issue by confining
this whole pact and discussion simply to the beneficial use of the water. If you wish
to make the pact in the form that gives that oblique attitude to it, then the responsibility of getting it through Congress will necessarily rest with you a great deal.
Id.
Il1. The Yellowstone River Compact has a clause which could be severed which states: "No
water shall be diverted from the Yellowstone River Basin wihtout the unanimous consent of all the
signatory states." Yellowstone River Compact of 1950, art. X. (reprinted in Documents on the Use
and Control of the Waters of Interstate and International Streams (T. Witmer 2d. ed. 1968).
112. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
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claimants even where the State had granted the water rights before it
entered into the Compact."'' Thus if the territorial use limitations forbid
RCG's lease plan, and if the Compact is immune from the Commerce
Clause, then the individual farmer must obey such restrictions as well." 4
CONCLUSION
The law of the river, coupled with the probability that the Colorado
River Compact is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny, creates serious problems for a group that is unlikely to befriend the Upper Basin
Commissioners."' Legal problems aside, RCG's proposal fails to satisfy
two of the prerequisites necessary for a viable water market: well defined
and easily transferable rights." 6
RCG's biggest practical problem is that water rights in the Upper Basin
are not well defined. "' It is difficult to ascertain how much water an
Upper Basin user has for sale when Upper Basin rights are defined in
terms of diversions rather than in terms of individual consumptive uses.
The Upper Basin states measure their use at state lines rather than at the
individual sites where water is consumed. Further, even though western
states do purport to administer rights based upon consumptive use, regulation is often not strict." 18
Water rights are not easily transferable either. As is often the case, a
farmer will divert more water than is actually needed for irrigation. The
rest of this water then returns to the stream where it is used downstream
at another point of diversion. The farmer's actual consumptive use would
have to be defined in the lease agreement to ensure that downstream users
would not be shortchanged. RCG faces decisive barriers to its plans
because individual consumptive uses are not presently quantified and there
are widespread local traditions of unregulated consumptive uses.
One of the main criticisms of western water markets is that cities are
often the only willing buyers and farmers or ranchers the only willing
sellers. The absence of many buyers and sellers creates a monopoly
situation in any market. Moreover, the lack of diversity in western water
markets tends over the long term to effectuate a redistribution of wealth
from the agricultural to the municipal sector. 't The RCG proposal, which
113. Id. at 106.
114. From a policy standpoint this is just because the territorial use provisions having historically
protected the Upper Basin from the harshness of prior appropriation also mandate that the rancher
not sell out to the Lower Basin user.
115. In fact at least two of the commissioners saw no difference between the RCG proposal and
the previous Galloway proposal. See Resource Conservation Group supra note 26.
116. See Brajer, Church, Cummings, and Farah, The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets
as They Affect Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29 Nat. Res. J. 489,496 (1989).
117. See text supra at 19.
118. See R. Smith, Troubled Waters: Financing Water in the West 132 (1984).
119. See Brajer, Church, Cummings & Farah, supra note 116, at 496.
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offers a temporary and rotational water leasing system, purports to mit.igate the harshness of this redistribution. In fact, the RCG proposal standing alone will not create such a redistribution. As long as the farmers
still farm, the tax base is not eroded and the Upper Basin economy remains
healthy.
However, the purpose of the Compact was to protect the Upper Basin
from the Lower Basin so that the Upper Basin could develop economically, and not just remain healthy. The right to water is a condition
precedent to economic growth.' The RCG proposal, if allowed, would
create a dangerous precedent threatening the Upper Basin's economic
growth. Even the suggestion of such a proposal is easily perceived as a
shift in the political equities which have for so long operated to separate
the two basins' use of water.'2 ' Rather than rekindling such fears, RCG
may well profit by avoiding the fight entirely.

120. Weatherford & Jacoby, supra note 10, at 212.
121. Id.

